P sychiatric advance directives are legal documents that allow competent individuals to declare their treatment preferences in advance of a mental health crisis. Recent Canadian jurisprudence, mental health legislation, and psychological research indicate that PADs could be accommodated within the Canadian legal framework to provide a greater role for patients to make autonomous treatment choices. Irrespective of how irrational or misguided the right to refuse medical treatment may appear, unwanted interference to one's body is a paramount right, and any legal exceptions are always carved from this fundamental rule. 1 Although such rights must be balanced with safety to oneself and others, PADs are rooted in a theory of liberal individualism that democratic societies should honour the rights of individuals to have their voices heard 2 while respecting the human needs of the mentally ill. 3 
Literature Search and Review
Search strategies to identify journal articles on PADs and the right to refuse medical treatment originated from medical and legal sources. The key term psychiatric advance directive was entered into Ovid's MEDLINE (30 hits) and overlapped with PsycINFO (9 hits) to identify articles (primarily from 1998 to the present, when PADs began appearing in the literature). After reviewing the abstracts and methodological quality of these studies, we included journal articles on the basis of their legal, medical, and ethical applicability to Canada. Twenty-nine articles were included in the final review. Of the 39 hits found in PsycINFO, MEDLINE, and legal databases, 9 articles were included. This is because PADs are also referred to as advance directives (for psychiatric care, mental care, and so on; these were included where appropriate). Using a Canadian legal database, Quicklaw, we searched legal cases by entering terms such as advance directives and right to refuse treatment and then noting up one of the first Canadian cases to deal with the right to refuse treatment in psychiatry: Fleming v. Reid. 4 (Noting up is a legal term to search jurisprudence that has subsequently followed, mentioned, or distinguished the primary case. Relevant legal cases up to and immediately following the leading case in this area of the law, Starson v. Swayze, 5 were included.) Mental health legislation was surveyed among Canadian provinces, primarily focusing on Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia. Leading academic textbooks (primarily Canadian) on consent and capacity law and mental disability have also been included.
Canadian Law and the Right to Refuse Treatment
Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary approach to mental health policy that can positively influence the emotional and psychological well-being of individuals. 6 Over the past 15 years, courts have become increasingly receptive to affirming patients' rights to make treatment choices regarding their bodies. In Malette v. Shulman, 7 an Ontario appeal court found a doctor liable under the tort of battery for administering a blood transfusion to a patient against her prior competent wishes expressed in a medical advance directive. The judge ruled, "The right to refuse treatment is an inherent component of the supremacy of the patient's right over his own body." 7, para 14 The traditional common law principle articulated in Malette was thereafter applied in the psychiatric context of Fleming v. Reid, 4 a ruling that represented a welcome change from the traditional view of people with mental illness as passive recipients of treatment to increased sensitivity to the detrimental effects of stigmatization. 8 In Sevels v. Cameron, 9 a patient suffering from paranoid schizophrenia made a prior competent wish to reject neuroleptics, and the substitute decision maker was required by law to follow the previously expressed wish. The judge declared, "[W]ishes are not a mere factor in best interests. They are the expression of the right of individuals to determine what shall be done with their bodies." 9, para 5 A concern raised by some is that, when patients are permitted to refuse medical treatment, physicians may be placed in an ethical dilemma between deciding on detention or treatment. 3, 9 Ontario legislation is unique among Canadian provinces in upholding an individual's prior competent wishes. The CCB is legally permitted to declare what a patient's best interest is only where prior capable wishes are not clearly expressed. 10 The CCB has the jurisdiction to discover whether prior capable wishes exist but does not wield a general discretion to override those wishes. 10 For example, in Conway v. Jacques, 11 an Ontario appeal court overruled the CCB's decision that a patient would have consented to the administration of new antipsychotic medication. Once a previously expressed competent wish no longer applies or a prior wish cannot be found for lack of evidence, the CCB must apply an objective test that considers the patient's best interests.
Throughout the 1990s, there was a trend in Canadian courts to abandon paternalistic attitudes that individuals with mental illness have no say in their treatment preferences and to move to a more patient-protective regime. This gradual evolution to advance patient liberties led to the 2003 Supreme Court decision of Starson v. Swayze, 5 which stood for the principle that individuals with mental illness have the right to make their own treatment choices when they are capable of understanding and appreciating the nature of their actions. The dissent focused on Starson's irrational and delusional ideas, while the majority highlighted his ability to make his own treatment decisions and willingness to acknowledge his past mental health problems. Scott Starson (his legal name since 1993) referred to himself and is identified by his colleagues in the field of physics as an exceptionally intelligent and unique person with the title Professor, although in fact he never received formal university training. Often representing himself in court, he declined certain forms of medical treatment as the side effects "dulled his mind," diminished his creativity, and were worse than death to him. 5, para 3,102
Ontario's HCCA determines mental incapacity to make decisions for one's treatment choices when there is evidence that the person is unable to understand information to make a treatment decision and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of a decision. 12 A person needs only to have the ability to appreciate the consequences of a decision and does not require actual appreciation for the consequences of disagreeing with psychiatrists. The practical implication of Starson is that individuals wishing to rebut a presumption of capacity will be required to bring clear and cogent evidence. 13 Ontario Superior courts have followed the majority in Starson in not overriding prior competent wishes when sufficient evidence has been presented before the CCB. In Boimier v. Swaminoth, 14 a psychiatrist believed that a patient with persecutory delusions was no longer capable of making his own treatment choices to stop taking medication. The court overturned the CCB's decision that the patient was incapable of refusing antipsychotics on the basis that there was no evidence the patient's mental health condition changed from his earlier wishes. In Scardoni v. Hawryluck, 15 the court ruled that express wishes regarding treatment refusal must be sufficiently specific and that a power of attorney can inform the context when someone lacks mental capacity. In Neto v. Klukach, 16 a mother found herself under pressure by the CCB to expressly admit she had a mental illness and to accept lithium for a diagnosis of bipolar disorder. The CCB must focus on whether the individual is capable of making a decision. 17 As a caveat to the Starson decision, it should be noted that Starson eventually got to the perilous point of losing excessive weight and was in no condition to contest treatment owing to his physical and mental condition. He was administered treatment and as a result showed marked improvement in his level of aggressive behaviour. Such an outcome may call into question the application of the Supreme Court's original Starson decision. Psychiatrists have a duty to treat patients, not simply to avoid medical negligence for failure to treat them in a timely manner but also because the genuine best interests of patients are at stake.
Psychiatric Advance Directives
PADs offer individuals suffering from a mental illness a practical means to express their treatment preferences in writing, [18] [19] [20] either through instructional directives (specific instructions outlined in advance), proxy directives (legal authority given to someone else to make decisions), or hybrid directives (incorporating both instructional and proxy directives). 21 The most controversial form of PADs occurs when anticipatory consent is given through a self-binding contract 22 when cyclical episodes of psychosis may prevent rational choices at some time.
The term "incapacity" refers to clinically defined periods of compromised decision-making ability, while "incompetency" is a legal term referring to court-determined periods of inability to make reasoned decisions. 23 Disagreements with mental health care professionals, relatives, or courts should not be equated with the status of incompetency, 24 often a difficult assessment to make during periods of decompensation and remission. [25] [26] [27] Finding and applying valid and reliable instruments to assess the level of competence at the time of documentation then becomes important. 28 Dresser 29 argues that the self is equally valid during a psychotic state and that overriding a presently articulated treatment preference with something expressed in the past is an unethical abridgement of the individual's liberty. To facilitate the eventual use of PADs, mental health professionals could be allowed one new opportunity to administer medication to a person with severe mental illness who would benefit from civil commitment. 30 Under this arrangement, patients with a first episode of psychosis, for example, could be medicated involuntarily if it is likely to benefit them, but after a certain level of stabilization, they would decide on future treatment preferences. A "one-free-shot" regime gives the individual maximal decision-making autonomy in the first few months to determine whether the treatment is valued. 31 Ensuring a physician is present when PADs are negotiated and documented has been shown to empower individuals, foster a healthy therapeutic relationship, and reduce patient anxiety during future medical crises. 25 Clinicians' positive attitudes toward PADs are likely to influence patients' interest in filling out such documents, particularly when they are responsible for introducing the directives to patients. 32 Research indicates that 90% of patients are likely to support decisions in a PAD when a psychiatrist or a mental health professional has declared the consumer competent at the time the PAD was executed. 23 When a PAD is completed in the presence of a trusted family member and mental health professional, it reassures individuals that, should another medical crisis arise, their competent wishes will be respected. 25 Psychiatric Advance Directives and the Right to Refuse Treatment in Canada
The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, Vol 52, No 6, June 2007 W Certain types of medical treatments carry more stigmatizing effects than others, which may affect treatment participation. [33] [34] [35] In Fleming, the court explored the efficacy of neuroleptics and stated that they carry "significant, and often unpredictable, short term [sic] and long term [sic] risks of harmful side effects." 6, para 27 When Professor Starson told the court that neuroleptics "slow down his brain," 6, para 39 the psychiatrist noted that, in general, only 60% of patients treated with neuroleptics respond favourably to new treatment. 5 Electroconvulsive therapy is another controversial treatment that can help certain mental disorders but whose mechanism is still unknown and therefore may not be desired by some patients. [36] [37] [38] Although not all provinces have legislated the prohibition of certain forms of treatment such as psychosurgery, 39 caregivers are seldom permitted to administer treatment without informed consent.
Some mental health service consumers believe they do not have a voice in their treatment options and comply only in response to threats. The MacArthur Research Network studies on coercion reveal that patients who believe they have a voice, and are treated by family members and clinicians in good faith during the process of hospital admission, experience significantly less coercion. 40 Procedural justice during the commitment and treatment phase can help decrease perceptions of coercion. 40 Subjecting individuals to treatment without their consent should only be permissible where serious harm would result to their health without such treatment. 41 PADs can also shape treatment decisions during emergencies when coercive practices are most likely to intrude into treatment. 42 They demonstrate value for patients' psychological perceptions and have the potential to motivate adherence with ongoing treatment plans, improve continuity of care, mobilize resources in the mental health service system, and improve crisis management. 43 Courts are beginning to require evience-based practice from clinicians that proves patients are receiving the best possible treatment grounded in scientifically rigorous research. 44 Lawyers' involvement in creating PADs as complex documents may be a hindrance to accessing them. 3, 23 However, PADs would likely be completed if individuals knew that they could be obtained with minimal costs and were centrally accessible. 45 Being able to access PADs and make information readily available to front-line treatment providers in times of critical care is also important. [46] [47] 
Mental Health Legislation
Without making any value judgments, we suggest that overly paternalistic mental health legislation can inadvertently detract from a patient's right to health, 48 particularly when it fails to balance respect for patient autonomy with the need to protect patients and society. Respect for individual autonomy is a compelling concept, yet framing autonomy in mental health legislation as an absolute right fails to consider interdependent duties of families and doctors toward the individual. Balance is the operative word when pitting autonomy against other important social values. McCubbin and Weisstub 49 have argued for a "pure best interests" model based solely on autonomous values, where decisions made for incompetent individuals should most closely resemble those that the patient would make if temporarily competent. Circumstances arise where individuals with mental incapabilities need state support and protective measures, but this must always be exercised in the least restrictive manner. There is a difference between the state acting with paternalistic beneficence and encouraging patient autonomy. 49 A comparison of provincial legislation reveals that whether PADs are perceived as valuable documents in parts of Canada may be related to the drafter's legislative intent in regard to treatment refusal. 50 Ontario mental health legislation has undergone many changes in the past 70 years, so courts rarely interfere with physicians' treatment handling of people with mental illness. 51 Currently, the CCB adjudicates on issues of mental incapacity under complementary pieces of legislation that are read together. 52 The Ontario HCCA states that, if the person does not know of a wish applicable to the circumstances, acting in the incapable person's best interests is permitted. 53 Instructional directives regarding anticipatory treatment can be recorded in any written form, orally, or in any other manner, 53 but when no prior capable wish has been stipulated, the best-interest standard is applied. In Ontario, there is a statutory basis to the right of anticipatory treatment refusal, 54 allowing competent patients to bind their future wishes through a power of attorney.
Mental health legislation in 2 provinces, Newfoundland and Labrador and British Columbia, allows directors of psychiatric hospitals to authorize treatment for involuntarily committed patients without obtaining consent. For example, in British Columbia, "treatment authorized by the director is deemed to be given with consent of the patient." 55 The director is ultimately responsible for patients' authorized treatment changes.
Under Alberta legislation, a competent patient has the right to refuse proposed treatment; however, the hospital board or attending physician may apply to a review panel that will decide what is in the patient's best interests. 56 This legislative arrangement finds itself on middle ground in that it gives more procedural rights than the restrictive British Columbia model but, unlike Ontario legislation, overrides a competent refusal for a patient's best interests. Manitoba was the first province to grant statutory recognition to instructional and proxy directives allowing capable persons to make health care directives. 57 The compromise position in Manitoba is that a substitute decision maker is bound to a patient's capable wish unless "following the patient's expressed wishes endangers the physical, mental health or safety of the patient or another person." 58 The Saskatchewan model avoids any potential Charter (the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) challenges to its legislation by stipulating that any person who is treatment competent cannot be involuntarily hospitalized. The legislation requires that a person be "unable to fully understand and to make an informed decision" 59 regarding his need for treatment care and supervision. Individuals with mental illness who are a danger to others are not committed unless they become incompetent or commit a Criminal Code offence. However, once they are detained, the attending physician can "administer or prescribe any medication or other treatment that is consistent with good medical practice and considered necessary to treat the mental disorder." 59 Quebec legislation focuses on protecting and fostering patients' rights as opposed to a treatment-based approach. Article 11 of the CCQ 60 states that no person may be made to undergo treatment except with his or her consent and that, if an individual is incapable of giving or refusing consent, someone authorized by law or mandate, given in anticipation of his or her incapacity, may do so. A functional approach to mental capacity is adopted, where consent to treatment is a question of fact based on the patient's ability to make decisions, not on the patient's legal status. 61 Article 16 of the CCQ 60 is an example of this functional approach where courts make the final decision. 61 PADs are essentially a form of a mandate that could be carved out of Article 12 (CCQ) that "a person who gives his consent to or refuses care for another person is bound to act in the sole interest of that person, taking into account, as far as possible, any wishes the latter may have expressed." 60 The term "as far as possible" expresses the idea that other factors and circumstances, such as those stipulated in a PAD, would be considered by the courts.
PADs have the potential to create a strong therapeutic alliance between doctors and patients, something lacking in mental health legislation. While such documents are primarily used to refuse certain forms of treatment, they can also be used to proceed to treatment when a person's capacity is compromised and possibilities of being adjudged are contemplated. If advance directive legislation were harmonized into a uniform and applicable set of national guidelines, concerns about provincial legislation upholding PADs in one province but not another could be alleviated. 62
Conclusion
Before PADs can be implemented in Canada, empirical research should be conducted on the perceptions of various stakeholders in the legal and mental health profession. It is possible that disparate views regarding PADs are related to provincial mental health legislation. At times, it may seem that law and psychiatry are in conflict when it comes to finding suitable legal standards, but these disciplines actually have the same goal of relieving suffering. Society's view of people with mental illness has changed dramatically over the years in Canada. The introduction of PADs may generate a respectful attitude and greater legal protection for the autonomous rights of people with mental illness while recognizing that individual rights must be balanced with the obligations of mental health professionals to deliver appropriate medical treatment.
